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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Katherine Stanfield appeals from her judgment of conviction for first-degree
murder entered following a jury trial.

She contends on appeal that the district court

erred by permitting Dr. Rorke-Adams to give surrogate testimony for the laboratory
technician who prepared the certain slides, thereby violating Ms. Stanfield's right to
confront the witnesses against her. Alternatively, Ms. Stanfield argues that Dr. RorkeAdams' testimony in this regard was inadmissible hearsay. In either case, she contends
that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that error was harmless. Ms. Stanfield
also asserts that the district court failed to properly instruct the jury as to all the
elements of the crime of felony murder by aggravated battery of a child under twelve.
Regarding the propriety of Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony, the State argues that the
doctor was only testifying as to her observations and that the technician made no
testimonial statements in regard to the samples and tests in this case, and therefore,
concludes that Ms. Stanfield had no right to cross examine the technician, nor did
Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony contain hearsay. The State argues, in the alternative, that
any error in allowing Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony was harmless because several other
doctors testified as to having reached similar conclusions as Dr. Rorke-Adams.
The State's argument on the Confrontation Clause relies on an assertion in the
plurality opinion in Williams v. Illinois,_ U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), which was
expressly rejected by five justices, and therefore, is not controlling precedent.

The

State's contention that the laboratory technician did not make any assertions upon
which to be confronted is also directly contrary to precedent. The same is true for the
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State's arguments on the alternative hearsay argument.

In fact, the Idaho Supreme

Court's decision in State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 425 (2009), which found virtually
identical testimony to constitute improper hearsay testimony, is directly on point in this
case.
Furthermore, the State's arguments on harmlessness assert that, even without
the error, the jury still would have found Ms. Stanfield guilty.

That approach to the

harmless error test has been expressly rejected by both the United States and Idaho
Supreme Courts.

Under a proper analysis, it is not possible to find that Dr. Rorke-

Adams' testimony surely did not contribute to the verdict, and therefore, the error was
not harmless. As such, this Court should vacate Ms. Stanfield's conviction and remand
the case for a new trial.
Regarding Ms. Stanfield's claim that the jury was improperly instructed, the State
relies on the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Carver, 155 Idaho 489
(2013), which found similar instructions in a similar factual scenario to be appropriate.
Ms. Stanfield recognizes the Carver decision, but maintains that the instructions in her
case do not properly instruct the jury.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Ms. Stanfield's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err by allowing Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify as to the work of
a laboratory technician in violation of Ms. Stanfield's Sixth Amendment right to
confront adverse witnesses, or alternatively, by allowing the introduction of
inadmissible hearsay testimony?
Did the district court deprive Ms. Stanfield of her constitutional rights to due
process and a jury trial when it failed to instruct the jury that, before it could find
her guilty of felony murder by aggravated battery of a child under twelve years of
age, it was required to find that she had the specific intent to commit the crime of
aggravated battery and cause great bodily harm to Wyatt?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Allowing Dr. Rorke-Adams To Testify As To The Work Of A
Laboratory Technician In Violation Of Ms. Stanfield's Sixth Amendment Right To
Confront Adverse Witnesses. Or Alternatively, By Allowing The Introduction Of
Inadmissible Hearsay Testimony

A.

Dr. Rorke-Adams' Surrogate Testimony As To The Assertions Of A Laboratory
Technician Violates The Confrontation Clause
The State's main contentions in regard to the Confrontation Clause issue are

that, because the laboratory technician only prepared the slides and did not submit any
formal reports, he made no assertions in this case, and thus, no confrontation issue
could arise. (Resp. Br., pp.4-8.) To support this conclusion, the State quotes from the
United State's Supreme Court's decision in Williams - specifically, the plurality opinion's
statement that testimony of an expert about the performance of a test by another
technician is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. (Resp. Br., pp.7-8 (quoting

Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228).)

However, only four of the justices endorsed the

assertion upon which the State relies.

See generally Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221. As

such, even though it is in the opinion which announced the result, that proposition is not
controlling law. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds .... "')
The reason that Justice Alito's plurality opinion is the lead opinion in Williams is
that it controls on the ultimate question - whether to affirm or reverse the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Illinois. On that ultimate question, Justice Thomas joined with the
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plurality opinion, but his conclusion was based on a completely different analysis. He
entirely rejected the rules and analysis used by the plurality, and thus, no part of the
plurality opinion can be said to be controlling law. See, e.g., United States v. Duron-

Caldera, 737 F.3d 988, 994 (5th Cir. 2013); State v. Manion, 295 P.3d 270, 279-80
(Wash. 2013) (explaining why the language quoted by the State in this case is not
As a matter of fact, five justices did agree that such testimony is

controlling law).

offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and, as a result, is subject to analysis under
the Confrontation Clause.

Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2257 (Thomas, J., concurring in

judgment); id. at 2269-70 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
In fact, the New Mexico Supreme Court, applying the analysis from the Williams
dissent, concluded that a forensic pathologists testimony, which related the conclusions
in a report from another pathologist, violated the defendant's confrontation rights.

State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 437-43 (2013). The State of New Mexico petitioned
for certiorari, asserting that the New Mexico Supreme Court's reliance on the Williams
dissent was improper. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari in New Mexico v. Navarette,
No.

12-1256,

pp.10-20,

available

at

http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/

uploads/2013/08/navarette-filed-petition-for-cert.pdf. The United States Supreme Court
denied that petition.

Supreme Court of the United States, Docket Page for New

Mexico v. Navarette, available at http:/lwww.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName
=/docketfiles/12-1256.htm.

As such, the State's reliance on the plurality opinion is

wholly misplaced.
Additionally, its argument that the laboratory technician did not make any
testimonial assertions is erroneous.

Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that the laboratory
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technician labeled the slides as belonging to Wyatt. (Resp. Br., p.6.) That means when
the laboratory technician returned the slides to Dr. Rorke-Adams, he necessarily
asserted that the samples on the slides were from Wyatt.

Dr. Rorke-Adams had no

personal knowledge of that fact, as she was not present when the slides were prepared.

(See, e.g., Tr., Vo.2, p.1196, Ls.3-9.) However, she did testify as to the fact that the
samples belonged to Wyatt. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, p.2034, Ls.11-16 ("Q. Could you
discuss where on Wyatt's body you found axonal injuries? A. The axonal injury was
present in the spinal cord.

And there was one slide that was labeled 'AA," and

there was seven sections of the spinal cord on that particular slide.").) The laboratory
technician's assertion was also necessarily offered for the truth of its contents. If the
samples were not from Wyatt, then Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony about her observations
of those slides is wholly irrelevant to the case, as it would not make any fact at issue in
the case against Ms. Stanfield more or less likely to be true.

State v. Watkins,

See I.R.

401;

148 Idaho 418, 425 (2009) (holding, under similar a factual

circumstance, "[i]f [the analyst's] statements were not truthful, [the testifying expert's]
interpretation of his tests would have been without evidentiary significance").
In addition, by returning the slides to Dr. Rorke-Adams, the laboratory technician
also necessarily asserted that he had performed the tests properly, as required by the
laboratory's policies. The State relies on the fact that Dr. Rorke-Adams testified about
the laboratory's routine procedures to claim that Dr. Rorke-Adams could testify that the
slides in this case were prepared according to those routine procedures.

(Resp.

Br., pp.8-10.) The State's logic presumes that, because there are routine procedures,
the laboratory technician followed those procedures.
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However, the United States

Supreme Court has rejected such arguments; it has held that, even if the tests were
conducted pursuant to the standard procedures, the defendant still has a right to
confront the analyst and "raise before a jury questions concerning [the analyst's]
proficiency,

the

care

he

took

in

performing

his

work,

and

his

veracity."

Bui/coming v. New Mexico,_ U.S._, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 n.7 (2011).

The State's logic has also been empirically disproved, as laboratory technicians
across the country have failed, or worse, deliberately circumvented, such procedures.
(See App. Br., pp.13-14.) The United States Supreme has recognized this fact, noting

that "[f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation."
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009). As such, it has held that

one of the purposes of the Confrontation Clause is "to weed out ... the fraudulent
analyst," Id. at 319-20, and "to expose any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst's part."
Bui/coming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715.

In this case, for example, the laboratory technician could have prepared a slide
with a sample from a source other than Wyatt, but dyed the sample properly, and
provided that slide to Dr. Rorke-Adams while asserting that the slide was properly
prepared. In that situation, Dr. Rorke-Adams could only say, as she did in this case,
that the sample appears to have been prepared in accordance with the routine
procedures. 1 That assertion would be factually wrong and any testimony about what
Dr. Rorke-Adams concluded from examining the slide would be of no relevance in the

Dr. Rorke-Adams is not competent to testify that the slides were prepared correctly, as
she is not competent to testify as to behavior which she, herself, did not witness. See,
e.g., Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10 (1972) ("To be competent to testify, a witness must
have the ability to perceive ... the occurrences involved.")
1
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case, but no amount of cross examination would be able to uncover that error. Only the
technician would be able to testify as to the veracity and accuracy of his performance of
the tests.

Thus, in that scenario, Ms. Stanfield would not have been afforded a

meaningful opportunity to cross examine the witnesses against her. And that is why the
United States Supreme Court has expressly held that "surrogate testimony of that order
does not meet the constitutional requirement." Bui/coming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
The State attempts to distinguish Melendez-Diaz on the idea that no formalized
reports are at issue, as they were in Melendez-Diaz.

(Resp. Br., p.7.) The State's

argument in this regard seems to invoke Justice Thomas's "indicia of solemnity" test for
analyzing whether an assertion is testimonial (i.e., the laboratory technician did not
make a formalized statement, so there is no right to cross examine the tecnhician).
Compare, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring

in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (initial articulation of a potential indicia of
solemnity test).

Such a test has never been endorsed by any of the other justices,

much less adopted by a majority, of the Supreme Court.
sensibly applied.

Nor can such a rule be

Under Justice Thomas' preferred standard, a sworn affidavit made

under the penalty of perjury would be subject to cross examination, but an off-the-cuff
remark, made when no penalty for untruthfulness would apply, would not. Such a result
would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Confrontation Clause, which is to prevent
the prosecution of defendants by use of out-of-court statements without affording the
defendant the opportunity to cross examine the declarants of those statements.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51. That rule applies regardless of the media in which they

are presented. See id. at 44 (discussing the use of two testimonial statements in the
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trial of Sir Walter Raleigh

testimony given to an investigating tribunal and statements

written in a letter - in order to explain the breadth of the protections afforded by the
Sixth Amendment).
Similarly, State attempts to distinguish Bui/coming on the idea that the person
who authored the final report in this case was called to testify. (Resp. Br., p.7.) That
assertion misreads the Bui/coming opinion.

The Bui/coming Court was focused on

whether the declarant of the out-of-court statements being used against the defendant
was subject to cross examination, not whether the author of the report was subjected to
cross examination.2 In that case, as here, the declarant was not subjected to cross
examination, and therefore, the defendants were deprived of their constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against them.
Specifically,

the

Bui/coming

Court

considered

whether one

laboratory

technician, Razatos was properly allowed to give surrogate testimony for another,
Caylor. Bui/coming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714. The Supreme Court was concerned because
Caylor, the author of the report at issue, had "certified that he received Bullcoming's
blood sample intact with the seal unbroken, that he checked to make sure that the
forensic report number and the sample number 'correspond[ed],' and that he performed
on Bullcoming's sample a particular test, adhering to a precise protocol." 3 Id. Razatos,
the testifying witness, "had neither observed nor reviewed Gaylor's analysis." Id. at

2

In Bui/coming, the declarant of the out-of-court statements and the author of the report
were the same person.
3 This list of Gaylor's activities includes virtually all of the same activities undertaken by
the laboratory technician in the present case. Therefore, if the failure to provide the
defendant in Bui/coming with the opportunity to cross examine Caylor violated the
Confrontation Clause, the failure to provide Ms. Stanfield with the opportunity to cross
examine the laboratory technician in this case also violates the Confrontation Clause.
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2712. The Supreme Court concluded that "surrogate testimony of the kind Razatos was
equipped to give could not convey what Caylor knew or observed about the events his
certification concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process he employed." Id. at
2715. Thus, the question is not whether the author of the report was called to testify, as
the State contends, but whether the declarant of the statement being used against the
defendant was called to testify. See id.; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
59 (2004) ("Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers' understanding:
Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where
the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity

to cross examine.") (emphasis added). In Bui/coming, Caylor was the declarant of the
testimonial statements being used against the defendant, and so, the defendant had the
right to cross examine Caylor. Id.
In this case, the non-testifying laboratory technician is the declarant of the
testimonial statements being used against Ms. Stanfield. The laboratory technician in
this case, like Caylor in Bui/coming, necessarily asserted that he adhered to the proper
protocols in preparing and labeling the slides in this case.

Therefore, since the

laboratory technician was the declarant, Ms. Stanfield had a right to cross examine the
laboratory technician. See id.
The only difference between Bui/coming and this case is the degree of formality
in the declarants' statements - Gaylor's certified report, as opposed to the statements
made by the laboratory technician to Dr. Rorke-Adams. However, as discussed supra,
the degree of formality does not govern whether the out-of-court statements are
testimonial. Since the laboratory technician's assertions in this case were made with
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the primary purpose of proving a fact for a subsequent prosecution, they are testimonial
and thus, inadmissible without the opportunity for confrontation.
Because Ms. Stanfield was not permitted to cross examine the laboratory
technician, she was deprived of her rights under the Confrontation Clause.

B.

Dr. Rorke-Adams' Testimony Contained Inadmissible Hearsay
The State's argument in regard to the hearsay issue is simply that "Dr. Rorke-

Adams testified as to her observations and her conclusions which she derived from her
examination of W.F.'s brain tissue. That is not hearsay." (Resp. Br., p.8 (emphasis in
original).) The State continues to rely on the assertion of the Williams plurality - that
such statements are not offered for their truth. (Resp. Br., p.10.) Aside from the fact
that five justices decided precisely the opposite, the Idaho Supreme Court has also
held, while reviewing a virtually-identical fact pattern, that such statements are made for
the truth of the matter asserted. See Watkins, 148 Idaho at 426-27.
Furthermore, the State does not articulate which of the hearsay rules it is relying
on for this premise.

It seems to contend that, because Dr. Rorke-Adams is only

testifying as to what she saw in the slides, she has personal knowledge that the
contents of the slides came from Wyatt. That is not the case, since she was not present
when the slides were prepared.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.1996, Ls.3-9.) Therefore, she has no

personal knowledge as to the preparation of those slides; she was necessarily relying
on the out-of-court statements made by the non-testifying analyst. Compare Watkins,
148 Idaho at 425 (pointing out that the testimony at issue in that case was meant to
relay the non-testifying analyst's statements for the truth of the matter asserted, and
thus, contained inadmissible hearsay evidence).
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Rather, the State's argument appears to be based I.RE. 703, which allows for an
expert to rely upon facts or data not otherwise admissible to form his or her expert
opinions if that is the sort of information upon which experts in that field traditionally rely.
In Watkins, the Idaho Supreme Court pointed out that I.RE. 703 was amended in 2002
to expressly forbid the type of testimony at issue here:
The amendment to I.RE. 703 serves to prevent an expert witness from
serving as a conduit for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible
evidence. In the present case, the district court did not make a finding that
Channell's [the non-testifying analyst] statements and notes were admitted
for the limited purpose of evaluating Dr. Finis' opinion [the doctor who
authored the final report and who gave testimony]. Further, it is evident
that the testimony was not offered for this limited purpose. Rather, the
State clearly relied upon the hearsay evidence for the purpose of
demonstrating chain of custody, Channell's testing methodology, and to
identify the locations [where on the evidence tested DNA was] found.
Aside from Dr. Finis' testimony, no other evidence on these subjects was
introduced. Accordingly, we conclude that Dr. Finis' testimony as to
hearsay received from Channell was not admissible pursuant to I.RE.
703.
Id. at 426-27.

Dr. Rorke-Adams offered essentially the same sort of testimony Dr. Finis offered
in Watkins: Dr. Rorke-Adams testified about the laboratory technician's handling of the
evidence (i.e., labeling of it), as well as his testing methodology (i.e., that he followed
the established routine procedures in preparing the slides). The district court did not
make a finding that those assertions were admitted for the limited purpose of evaluating
Dr. Rorke-Adams' opinion.
the out-of-court statements:

(See generally Tr.)

Further, the State clearly relied on

"You heard from

Lucy Rorke-Adams, a forensic

neuropathologist ... She created slides, and she looked closely at what was going on in
Wyatt's brain .... She also told you about the process that was called beta amyloid
staining where she can see axonal injury." (Tr., Vol.3, p.4394, Ls.17-24; Tr., Vol.3,
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p.4395, Ls.13-15.) Aside from Dr. Rorke-Adams, no witness offered testimony about
the contents of the slides or the evidence of axonal injury.

(See generally Tr.)

Therefore, just as in Watkins, Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony included inadmissible
hearsay.
The State also attempts to argue that Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony about the
laboratory's routine was acceptable pursuant to I.R.E. 406, and as such, was not
hearsay. The State's argument is misplaced for several reasons. First, I.R.
specialized rule of relevancy, not an exception to the hearsay rule.
803-04 (articulating the exceptions to Idaho's hearsay rule).

406 is a

Compare I.R.E.

Idaho's rule against

hearsay makes an otherwise relevant statement inadmissible if it is "a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.

801(c). Therefore, even if

I.R.E. 406 makes the testimony about the laboratory's practices relevant, it does not
make Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony about the laboratory technician's assertions
admissible under the hearsay rules.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court's discussion in Bui/coming
demonstrates that the existence of standard procedures is not relevant when the
question is what a non-testifying laboratory technician did with the evidence and there is
no testimony to show that the technician followed the standard procedures:
We do not question that analyst Caylor, in common with other analysts
employed by SLD, likely would not recall a particular test, given the
number of tests each analyst conducts and the standard procedure
followed in testing. Even so, Cay/or's testimony under oath would have
enabled Bu/lcoming's counsel to raise before a jury questions concerning
Cay/or's proficiency, the care he took in performing his work, and his
veracity.
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Bui/coming, 131 S. Ct. 2715 n.7 (emphasis added). The Court clarified that, even if
Caylor were presumed to have followed a standard procedure in the testing, the
defendant is still prejudiced by the lack of an opportunity to cross examine him. See id.
Whether or not the laboratory technician followed the standard procedures is a question
of fact of the jury to decide. While testimony about the standard operating procedures is
relevant, making that fact more likely true, see I.RE. 406, that rule does not allow
Dr. Rorke-Adams to offer hearsay testimony to that fact. Therefore, whether there were
standard procedures is not a reason to allow the surrogate testimony offered in this
case. 4
Given that proper interpretation of the evidentiary rules, it is not surprising that
the Idaho Supreme Court did not allow testimony of a similar nature to survive the
prohibition against hearsay evidence, even though the laboratory testing in question
certainly appeared to be routine in Watkins: "i.e., that Channell received the box, put it
into a vault, and later opened it and removed the sexual assault kit containing the sixyear-old girl's DNA sample," and that Channell tested the evidence for DNA of the
alleged victim and perpetrator. 5 Watkins, 148 Idaho at 423. As such, Dr. Rorke-Adams'

4

As discussed in the Appellant's Brief, the existence of standard operating procedures
does not ensure that laboratory technicians follow them on any particular occasion.
See, e.g., Deborah Becker, "Examining The 'Red Flags' In A Massachusetts Crime Lab
Scandal," NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO,
(November 23,
2013),
available at
http://www.npr.org/2013/11/23/246591027/examining-the-red-flags-in-a-massachusettscrime-lab-scandal (reporting that a laboratory technician pied guilty to numerous
charges of falsifying evidence and improper testing of evidence, despite the fact that the
laboratory operated under nationally established recommendations for testing of drug
evidence").
5 Besides receiving and storing the evidence, Mr. Channell also collected samples from
the evidence and performed DNA analysis on those samples. See generally Watkins,
148 Idaho 423-27.
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similar testimony as to the routines or procedures of the laboratory technician in this
case should have also been excluded as improper hearsay testimony.

C.

The State Has Failed To Meet Its Burden To prove That The Error In This Case
Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The State contends that, because numerous other witnesses testified about the

injuries Wyatt suffered, any error in allowing Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify as to the
laboratory technician's out-of-court statements, which underlay her ultimate opinion that
Wyatt brain displayed axonal injury and thus, his injuries were not accidental, was
harmless. That argument is erroneous in that it is based on a misapplication of the
harmless error test. The State advocates the appellate court sit as a thirteenth juror and
weigh the remaining evidence presented by the State's witnesses to conclude that the
jury would have convicted Ms. Stanfield without the erroneous admission of Dr. RorkeAdams' testimony. The State does not make any assertions as to whether the error
surely did not contribute to the verdict. Because the State has not met its burden to
prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the correct standard, this
case should be remanded for a new trial.
Idaho

applies

the

two-part

harmless

Chapmanv.Cafifornia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

error

test

established

in

State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013).

Under this test, "the defendant must establish the existence of an error, 'at which point
the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."' Id. (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010)). To meet
that burden, the State must "prove[ ] 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
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complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."'

Perry, 150 Idaho at 221

(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24)); see also Joy, 155 Idaho at 11 (same).
In interpreting Chapman, the United States Supreme Court has explained that:
To say that an error did not "contribute" to the ensuing verdict is not, of
course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial
later held to have been erroneous . . . . To say that an error did not
contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation
to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as
revealed in the record.
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds by
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991). "Thus, an appellate court's inquiry 'is

not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have
been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error."' Joy, 155 Idaho at 11 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275, 279 (1993)) (emphasis in original).
Despite those holdings from both the Idaho and United States Supreme Courts,
the State argues that, "with or without Dr. Rorke-Adams' explanation of what she saw
on the slides, the jury would have reached the inevitable conclusion, based on the
voluminous evidence presented in this case, that W.F. suffered an abusive, nonaccidental head trauma," and therefore, the error was harmless. 6 (Resp. Br., p.15.)

6

The State also contends that Ms. Stanfield ignored the testimony of the other doctors
in her opening brief. (Resp. Br., p.12.) That is untrue, given that Ms. Stanfield
specifically pointed out that Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony was "repetitive of the testimony
of those other doctors.... As such, her testimony, absent those aspects about the
slides, which should have been barred by the Confrontation Clause and the Rules of
Evidence barring hearsay, would have been nothing more than cumulative testimony.
See I.RE. 403." (App. Br., p.19 n.6.) Ms. Stanfield did not go further in her discussion
of that other testimony because it was not necessary to the question of harmlessness;
the question is whether Dr. Rorke-Adams' erroneous testimony surely did not contribute
to the verdict, and Ms. Stanfield contended that it did. (App. Br., pp.18-20.) Based on
16

That argument essentially asks this Court to sit as a thirteenth juror and reweigh the
evidence, and thereby conclude that a guilty verdict surely would have been rendered
absent the error, rather than evaluate whether the guilty verdict in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error. Compare Joy, 155 Idaho at 11; Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279.
Since that argument has been expressly rejected by both the Idaho and United States
Supreme Courts, this Court should reject it in this case.
Properly applying the Chapman harmless error test, it is not possible to say that
this evidence was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered, and
therefore, it is not possible to conclude that the guilty verdict in this case was surely
unattributable to the verdict.

Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that the stains applied to the

samples on those slides would help her to identify damage to the axons, and that the
nature of the axonal injury would show what type of forces were involved in the incident.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.2023, L.4 - p.2024, L.21.) She also testified that the slides demonstrated
that Wyatt had suffered axonal injuries, 7 which proved that his injuries resulted from
severe linear, rotating, angular forces, akin to whiplash.
L.4 - p.2026, L.9.)
theory of the case.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.2023,

She provided the scientific proof that contradicted the defense's
As such, it cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony did not contribute to this verdict.

that analysis, she argued that the State would be unable to demonstrate that the error
was harmless. (App. Br., pp.18-20.) At any rate, there was no burden on Ms. Stanfield
to establish prejudice in her opening brief. The burden in this regard is on the State.
7 Her conclusion that these slides demonstrated Wyatt had suffered from these injuries
is premised entirely on the laboratory technician's assertions - his labeling of the slides
and his preparation of the samples - and thereby, his assertions that the samples on
the slides belonged to Wyatt.
17

Furthermore, Dr. Rorke-Adams's testimony provided scientific proof supporting
the conclusions of many of the State's other witnesses.

However, there was a

substantial amount of testimony offered by medical experts directly criticizing the
conclusions offered by the State's witnesses. For example, pediatric neuroradiologist
Patrick Barnes testified that there was a growing body of evidence that demonstrated
the constellation of symptoms on which many of the State's experts were basing their
conclusions could also be produced by accidentally-encountered forces, meaning the
State's experts' conclusion were not scientifically accurate.

(See, e.g., Tr., Vol.2,

p.2288, Ls.14-24.) As another example, ophthalmologist David Mark testified that there
were too many potential alternatives for the hemorrhaging to appropriately reach the
"black and white" conclusion Dr. Crawford did. (Tr., Vol.2, p.2483, Ls.5-12.) Pediatric
intensivist and anesthesiologist Gregory Hammer also offered testimony and evidence
criticizing the conclusions reached by the State's experts.

(See generally Tr., Vol.2,

pp.3069-3236.) In that situation, where there is a battle of experts ensuing, it is difficult
to see how Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony did not contribute to the jury's decision to
believe the one set of medical experts, and therefore, convict Ms. Stanfield. In fact,
given that the jury deliberated for nearly fourteen hours (see R., pp.669-70), the record
demonstrates that the evidence was not overwhelming. 8 Therefore, it is not possible to
say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony did not contribute to
the verdict.

It is interesting that the State argues there was overwhelming evidence based only on
the testimony offered by the State's witnesses. (See Resp. Br., pp.11-15.) Given the
substantial expert testimony offered in contradiction of the State's witnesses' testimony
and the amount of discussion the jury undertook, it is disingenuous to say that the
evidence in this case was "overwhelming."
8
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Therefore, since Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony helped convince the jury that
Wyatt's injuries were non-accidental, the State has failed to show

her testimony

surely did not contribute to the guilty verdict. Therefore, regardless of how many other
experts testified as to similar conclusions, the State has failed to prove that the
erroneous decision to allow Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. As such, this case should be remanded for a new trial.

11.
The District Court Deprived Ms. Stanfield Of Her Constitutional Rights To Due Process
And A Jury Trial \/\/hen It Failed To Instruct The Jury That, Before It Could Find Her
Guilty Of Felony Murder Bv Aggravated Battery Of A Child Under Twelve Years Of Age,
It Was Required To Find That She Had The Specific Intent To Commit The Crime Of
Aggravated Battery And Cause Great Bodily Harm To Wyatt
Ms. Stanfield acknowledges the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Carver, 155
Idaho 489, in which the Court upheld the validity of similar jury instructions as they
related to a similar fact pattern.

Nevertheless, mindful of the Carver decision,

Ms. Stanfield maintains that her conviction must be vacated because the jury was not
properly instructed on all the elements of the offense.
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CONCLUSION

Ms. Stanfield respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of
conviction and remand her case for a new trial at which she is allowed to confront the
witnesses against her and at which the State is required to prove all the elements of
felony murder.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2014.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

I
State Appellate Public Defender
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